

Comparative Political Economy

Political Science 735

The Ohio State University

Autumn 2006

Tuesday, 9:30-12:18, Derby Hall room 38

Professor: Massimo Morelli¹

Course Description

This course will provide a graduate level introduction to the study of comparative political economy. We will read works from a variety of fields. Some works will have formal models to illustrate arguments, but for our purposes the technical aspects of the models are not important. The course draws empirical examples from a wide range of countries, but will be mostly focused on theoretical debates.

The first seminar will be devoted to the integration of the rational choice approach with sociological and historical methodologies. The second and third seminar will be on institutions: We will look first at the origin of institutions, and then at their relevance for economic outcomes. As their description includes a description of institutions, by the fourth seminar we will be ready to discuss political regimes. Since different political regimes may also reflect different cultures, the fifth seminar will be devoted to the meaning of political culture. The sixth seminar will concern pluralism and ethnic conflict, to see when different cultures can coexist or clash.

The last four seminars will be more "applied": on the welfare state, on the evolution of the relative role of states and markets in the last 2 centuries, on the relationship between trade and democracy, and on the possibility of political business cycles.

Course Requirements:

¹Office: 2189 Derby; Phhone: 292 5599. Office hours: Wednesday, 2:00-4:30 P.M. or by appointment, morelli.10@osu.edu.

1. All course participants are expected to read the course materials before class, and to come prepared to examine and critically discuss these works. (20% of grade)
2. Class presentation: Each participant will choose a week for which he or she will be responsible for leading off the discussion with a 30 minute presentation. Strong presentations will:

Describe the key conceptual issues; Describe the central arguments/debates in the literature on the question; Offer criticisms and/or suggest pathways for future research. (20% of grade)
3. Each seminar participant will choose a week for which he or she will write a five-page critical comment on the readings. The short essays will be distributed to all course participants via email the day before class (Monday) by 5 p.m. (20% of grade)
4. Finally, all course participants will be required to produce a 10-15 page research design that will serve as the final paper for the course. This research design should propose a viable question for investigation in CPE. The research design should include: 1) a statement of a research question; 2) a literature review that may incorporate, but not be limited to, assigned readings from this course; 3) a specification of hypotheses that draw from the literature or new; and 4) description of the methods and evidence that will be used to evaluate the hypotheses. Topics must be chosen and an abstract of the research design must be submitted by Monday, November 20 at 5 p.m. (40% of grade)

Detailed plan of the ten seminars

- September 26: Introductory 30 minute presentation of the course, followed by discussion of the following articles on the rational, historical and sociological approaches to Comparative Political Economy. The focus of the discussion should be on the distinction between areas or subjects in which we expect

multiple approaches to be complementary from areas or subjects in which we expect the incompatibilities to dominate the synergies.

1. Levi, M. "A Model, a Method and a Map: Rational Choice in Comparative and Historical Analysis," in Mark Lichbach and Alan Zuckerman, eds. *Comparative Politics*. (Cambridge). 19-41.
 2. Schofield, N. (2000): "Constitutional Political Economy: On the Possibility of Combining Rational Choice Theory and Comparative Politics," *Annual Review of Political Science*, v. 3 issue 277, p. 303. (OhioLINK).
 3. Shepsle, K. (1989): "Studying Institutions: Some Lessons from the Rational Choice Approach." *Journal of Theoretical Politics* (July): 131-49.(EJC/OhioLink).
 4. March, J.G., and J.P. Olsen (1984): "The New Institutionalism: Organizational Factors in Political Life," *American Political Science Review*, **78-3** pp. 734-749. (JSTOR)
 5. Lieberman (2001): "Causal Inference in Historical Institutional Analysis: A Specification of Periodization Strategies," *Comparative Political Studies*, **34-9**, p. 1011.
- October 3: Comparative Political Economy of *Institutions I*. How do we explain the emergence and evolution of institutions? What is path dependence and what, if anything, does it help us understand?
 1. Greif, A. and D. Laitin (2004): "A Theory of Endogenous Institutional Change," *American Political Science Review*, v. 98 issue 4, p. 633-652. (OhioLINK)
 2. Pierson (2000): "Increasing Returns, Path Dependence, and the Study of Politics," *American Political Science Review*, **94-2**, p. 251. (OhioLINK)
 3. Hall, P. and R. Taylor, (1996): "Political Science and the Three New Institutionalisms," *Political Studies*, **44-5**, p. 936-957. (OhioLink)

4. Shepsle, K. (1986): "Institutional Equilibrium and Equilibrium Institutions," in Herbert F. Weisberg, ed. *Political science: the science of politics*, Agathon Press, p. 51-81
- October 10: The Comparative Political Economy of *Institutions II*. To what extent economic development depends on political institutions? Core readings:
 1. North, D. (1990): "Institutions and their Consequences for Economic Performance," in Cook and Levi, *The Limits of Rationality*, p. 383-401.
 2. Acemoglu, D., S. Johnson, J.A. Robinson (2001): "The Colonial Origins of Comparative Development: An Empirical Investigation," *American Economic Review*, **91**-5.
 3. Przeworski A. et al. (2000): *Democracy and development : political institutions and material well-being in the world, 1950-1990* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press): chapters 3-5.
 4. Glaser, E., la Porta, Lopez DeSilanes and Shleifer, "Do Institutions Cause Growth?" *Journal of Economic Growth*, **9**, 271-303.
 5. Rodrik et al. (2004): "Institutions Rule; The Primacy of institutions over Geography and Integration in economic Development," *Journal of Economic Growth* **9**, 131-65
 6. Boix, *Democracy and Redistribution*, ch. 4.
 - October 17: The Comparative Political Economy of *Political Regimes*. What are the relevant distinctions between different types of political regimes? How can we measure the nature of constitutional arrangements (e.g., the level of separation of powers, federalism, judicial independence, etc.), and what data can we find? What data measure the degree of "democracy" across countries and over time? Core readings for discussion:
 1. Shugart, M. and J.M. Carey (1995): *Presidents and Assemblies. Constitutional Design and Electoral Dynamics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press), chapters 1-4.

2. Bingham Powell (2000): *Elections as instruments of democracy: majoritarian and proportional visions* (New Haven : Yale University Press), Part I
 3. Tsebelis, G. "Decision making in political systems: veto players in presidentialism, parliamentarism, multicameralism and multipartyism," *British Journal of Political Science* 25:289-325.
 4. Przeworski, A. et al (2000): *Democracy and development : political institutions and material well-being in the world,1950-1990* (Cambridge : Cambridge University Press) Chapter 1;
 5. Lijphart, *Patterns of Democracy*, chapters 1-3
- October 24: The Cultural Context.
What is political culture and where does it come from? How should we measure culture? Or shouldn't we? Core readings:
 1. Almond G. and S. Verba (1963): *The Civic Culture*, Princeton: Princeton University Press. Passim, but especially chapters 1, 5, 10, 11-13.
 2. Elkins D.J. and R.E.B. Simeon (1979): "A Cause in Search of Its Effect, or What Does Political Culture Explain?" *Comparative Politics*, 11, 127-146.
 3. Greif A. (1994): "Cultural Beliefs and the Organization of Society: A Historical and Theoretical Reflection on Collectivist and Individualist Societies," *Journal of Political Economy*, Vol. 102, No. 5, pp. 912-950.
 4. Posner, D. (2004): "The Political Salience of Cultural Differences: Why Chewas and Tumbukas are Allies in Zambia and Adversaries in Malawi," *American Political Science Review*, 98:529-46.
 - October 31: Pluralism and Ethnic Conflict. What causes civil war? What causes or constitute a social revolution? Core readings:
 1. Lijphart, A. (1977): *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration* (New Haven: Yale University Press), chapters 1-2 (pp. 1-52).

2. Snyder, J. (2000): *From Voting to Violence: Democratization and Nationalist Conflict* (New York: W. W.Norton), chap. 1 (pp. 15-44).
 3. Fearon, J., and D. Laitin (1996): "Explaining Interethnic Cooperation," *American Political Science Review*, **90**-4 715-735.
- November 7: Comparative Political Economy of the *Welfare State*. What determines the size of government?
 1. Gosta Esping-Andersen (1990): *The Three Worlds of Welfare Capitalism*, Princeton. Chapter 1
 2. Pierson, P. (1996): "The New Politics of the Welfare State," *World Politics* 48, 2 p.143-79. (Online);
 3. Iversen, T. "The Dynamics of Welfare State Expansion," In *The New Politics of the Welfare State*, Paul Pierson, editor (OUP,2001)
 4. Scarbrough, E. (2000): "West European welfare states: The old politics of retrenchment," *European Journal of Political Research*, **38**-2 p. 225 259 (OhioLink)
 5. Mares, I. (2003): "The Sources of Business Interest in Social Insurance," *World Politics*, p. 229.
 - November 14: Changing Divide Between States and Markets.
 1. Karl Polanyi (2001): *The Great Transformation*, 2nd edition, Beacon Press. Chs, 1, 2, 4-6, 16, 17.
 2. Przeworski, A. (1985): *Capitalism and Social Democracy*, Cambridge.
 - November 21: The relevance of trade, and its relationship with democracy and conflict.
 1. Hiscox, M. *International Trade and Political Conflict: Commerce, Coalitions, and Mobility*, Chs. 1-4, 11, 12, 13.

2. Adsera A. and C. Boix (2002): "Trade, Democracy, and the Size of the Public Sector: The Political Underpinnings of Openness," *International Organization*, 56, 2 p. 229-262. (OhioLink)
 3. Frye T. and E. Mansfield (2003): "Fragmenting Protection: The Political Economy of Trade Policy in the Post-Communist World," *British Journal of Political Science*, **33**-4 p. 635-657.
 4. Rogowski, R. (1987): "Trade and the Variety of Democratic Institutions," *International Organization* **41**-2 203-223. JSTOR
- November 28: Political Business Cycle.
 1. Hibbs, D. (1977): "Political Parties and Macroeconomic Policy," *APSR* 1467- 87. (JSTOR.)
 2. Clark, W. et al. (1998): "International and Domestic Constraints on Political Business Cycles in the OECD Economies," *International Organization* 52 (1) 87-120. (JSTOR)
 3. Nordhaus, W. (1975): "The Political Business Cycle," *Review of Economics Studies*, 42, 169-173.
 4. Alesina, A. (1989): "Politics and Business Cycles in Industrial Democracies," *Economic Policy*, 8:55-98.

Academic Honesty: I expect all of the work you do in this course to be your own. I will tolerate absolutely no cheating or plagiarism (using someone else's words or ideas without proper citation). I will report any cases of cheating or plagiarism to the university committee on academic misconduct, and they will be handled according to university policy.

Disability: If you need an accommodation based on the impact of a disability, you should contact me to arrange an appointment as soon as possible. At the appointment we can discuss the course format, anticipate your needs, and explore potential accommodations. I rely on the Office for Disability Services for assistance in verifying the need for accommodations and developing accommodation strategies. If you have not previously contacted the Office for Disability Services, I encourage you to do so.