

MEANS, MOTIVE, AND OPPORTUNITY
Politics, Community Needs, and
Community Oriented Policing Services Grants

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Both local and national political considerations may play a role in determining the distribution of intergovernmental grant funds. This article focuses on the Community Oriented Policing Services program from 1993 to 1997 to examine how local politicians weigh their electoral desires against community needs in their decisions to apply for grants and how national politicians and bureaucrats similarly determine their responses to cities' requests. Due to electoral pressures, mayors were more likely than city managers to seek the short-term grants. National party politics also seemed to affect the allocation of grant funds. Finally, community needs played a role, as cities with high crime rates, police-funding shortages, and the ability to support the new officers after the grants expired were more likely to request grants. Communities with larger minority populations were less likely to request grants and were given fewer funds.

Scholars have long been interested in the distributive politics surrounding intergovernmental grants. From Key's (1937) initial treatise, through the work of Holcombe and Zardkoohi (1981) linking committee positions to grant levels and Chubb's (1985) evaluation of grant monitoring, political scientists have found a key political role for the federal government in the allocation and administration of grants. Inman (1988) even finds that politics trumps policy goals, with efficiency and equity giving way to redistributive pork barrel considerations.

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In addition to the federal-level focus, scholars have examined politics and policy at the recipient government level. Stein (1981) studies aid to municipalities, noting that community need is a strong factor affecting where grant funds are directed. In later work, Stein (1984) finds that municipalities are cautious in the acceptance of grants, knowing that once the grant is removed it will be politically difficult for the recipient government to reestablish previous levels of funding and employment. Romer and Rosenthal (1980) extend their classic setter model to the case of intergovernmental grants, arguing that recipient governments can use the receipt of grants to increase spending even beyond the levels desired by the median voter. Filimon, Romer, and Rosenthal (1982) test this model, finding that school boards and other officials used grants to dramatically inflate spending levels in Oregon schools. Rich (1989, 1993) brings together the policy and political aspects at the recipient level in his studies of community development block grants. In addition to political variables, he finds that community needs, local demand, and prior experience with government grants all significantly contribute to the determination of grant funding.

However, two main shortcomings exist in the literature on the politics of intergovernmental grant giving. First, such studies tend to limit their analysis to a single level of government: either the donor or the recipient level (but see Schneider & Ji, 1990).¹ Such limitations do not allow an exploration of how one level of government may influence decisions at another level. For example, local politicians may place pressure on national politicians to structure grants in ways that benefit local political interests and address community needs. In addition, national politicians may seek to influence local decisions to apply for and accept intergovernmental grants to gain credit from subsequent grant benefits. Second, studies of the political aspects of intergovernmental grants have typically neglected electoral considerations. Theoretically, grants could be offered, applied for, and accepted at a greater rate prior to local or national elections, along the lines of the political business cycle theories. Moreover, vulnerable politicians may advance grant programs in hopes of using grant funding to enhance their reelection prospects.

In this article, we take a step toward rectifying these shortcomings by focusing on how both national and local politics influence the dis-

tribution of intergovernmental grants to major cities (with populations over 100,000) under the Community Oriented Policing Services (COPS) program from 1993 through 1997. The structure of this grant-in-aid program allows us to address numerous questions concerning the electoral considerations prevalent in grant decisions. For example, with regard to the decision to apply for grants, do local politicians apply for grants prior to elections in hope of enhancing their prospects through fiscal illusion? Are elected mayors thus more likely to apply for grants than are appointed city managers? Can vulnerable members of Congress exert pressure on local politicians' grant application decisions in hopes of electoral gain at the congressional level? A similar set of questions arises surrounding the decision by the COPS office in the Department of Justice regarding what level of funds to give city applicants: Are more and larger grants given by the administration prior to the presidential election? Are grants targeted at cities that offer strong electoral support for the administration? Are vulnerable members of Congress able to affect these administrative decisions to enhance their reelection chances?

To address these questions, we focus on local and national political considerations as well as on community needs in the decisions of whether to apply for COPS grants and of what size grants will be given. Regarding local politics, we explore the effects of electoral considerations, institutional structures, and minority influence. With regard to community needs, we focus on whether cities with high crime rates, current underprovision of police services, and other high-demand conditions are able to secure funding under the COPS program. Regarding national politics, we seek to determine whether the Clinton administration was more likely to give more and larger grants to cities that displayed strong Democratic support in 1992 and whether the number and size of allocated grants expanded prior to the 1996 elections. In addition, we examine the possibility of vulnerable members of Congress seeking to influence the decisions of local politicians and of the COPS office in determining the size and scope of grants issued.

The following section describes the origins and administration of the COPS program and explains why this program is well suited to address both local and national electoral considerations. We then examine the theoretical arguments of how politics and community

needs influence the allocation of intergovernmental grants from the federal government to large cities. Finally, we use logit analyses to examine which cities requested COPS assistance and ordinary least squares and tobit regression analyses to address how the Department of Justice responded to these requests.

GRANT RECEIPTS IN THE COPS PROGRAM

On September 13, 1994, President Clinton signed the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act (1994), authorizing \$30.2 billion in federal spending over 6 years to fulfill that year's State of the Union pledge to put 100,000 new police officers on the nation's streets. The Crime Act served as an extension and dramatic expansion of the Police Hiring Supplement grant program begun in 1993. Between 1993 and the end of 1997, almost 70,000 new officers had been funded through these two programs.

The details of the grant requirements are as follows. States and localities apply to the COPS office at the U.S. Department of Justice for funding of new officers. The COPS office reviews the grant applications and may then offer the recipient government a grant to partially offset salary and benefits for each newly hired officer over 3 years, up to a maximum of \$75,000 per officer. The federal government disburses the grants to cover up to 75% of the officer's expenses for the first year, 50% of expenses in the second year, and 25% in the third year, with no coverage thereafter. Recipient governments are required to continue to employ and fund the officers even after the 3-year grant expires. As part of the application process, recipient government officials must sign a pledge to that effect.

To facilitate the distribution of grants, the COPS office developed several initiatives, each with its own specific deadline. Police Hiring Supplement and Phase I were established and administered in 1993, although some of the funds were not awarded until 1994. COPS Accelerated Hiring Education and Deployment (AHEAD) was developed in 1994, as the initial push after the Crime Act. This was followed by the COPS Funding Accelerated for Smaller Towns (FAST), COPS Universal Hiring Program (UHP), and COPS Making Officer

Redeployment Effective (MORE) programs, with various sub-programs and deadlines from 1995 to the present.²

The program started slowly, with various politicians (mainly Republicans) and members of the press questioning whether the goal of 100,000 new officers would ever be met. Many city and state governments were skeptical about applying for short-term funding that would be costly down the road. In addition to their pledge and the program requirements ensuring the officers remained employed after the grant expired, local politicians would find it politically costly to lay off police officers, especially if the public considered crime a major issue. There is substantial empirical evidence of a “flypaper effect” of grant money sticking where it hits (see reviews and examinations by Fossett, 1990; Gramlich, 1977; Hines & Thaler, 1995). And states and localities often substitute their own funds for previous federal funds on a decrease in intergovernmental grants (Forrester & Spindler, 1990; Stonecash, 1990; Stotsky, 1991; Volden, 1999). For many mayors and city managers, these long-term costs weighed heavily. However, in an attempt to reach the 100,000 officer goal, the COPS office encouraged many communities to apply and accepted the vast majority of funding proposals, especially those of major cities. Eventually, hundreds and then thousands of communities applied for and received COPS funding.

The structure of these grants makes COPS an ideal program through which to study local and national political considerations, for three reasons. First, because program funding was offered in stages over multiple years, politicians could use the grants whenever it was most electorally beneficial to do so. Second, in the COPS program, a combination of local and national decisions determined which cities would receive grants and what size the grants would be. Local politicians decided whether to apply in each phase of the program and often specified the size of grant desired; the COPS office decided whether to fund the request and what grant size to award. Therefore, the potential for both national and local political considerations can enter the analysis of both (a) which cities applied for the grants and (b) what proportion of each funding request was awarded. Third, the program goals (increasing police and reducing crime) are broadly applicable to all cities. Analysis of this program is therefore not skewed toward cities

in particular areas or those facing special circumstances (as scholars might find with a focus on such programs as disaster relief, defense contracting, and so on). Although community policing needs may vary, all large cities could make a plausible case for COPS funds.

POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

The choice of whether to apply for an intergovernmental grant is an inherently political one, especially under the COPS program. Because of the short-term nature of the grants, mayors, council members, and city managers must weigh the short-term benefits from the grant funds and the added police officers against the long-term costs of maintaining the enhanced police force (or the political costs of cutting back that force). This decision is based on the preferences and incentives of local politicians who may be influenced by electoral concerns, institutional pressures, and interest group pressures.

ELECTIONS

The link between election timing and policy outcomes has long intrigued political economists. Beginning with the study of macroeconomic policies at the national level, scholars have focused on political business cycles, noting the correlation between economic trends and electoral timing. Nordhaus (1975) and Lindbeck (1976) modeled opportunistic behavior on the part of elected politicians. In the models, because the public understands neither government nor the economy very clearly, politicians can artificially stimulate the economy prior to elections to gain the votes necessary to return to office before an economic downturn.

The initial evidence for political business cycles was mixed but extensively gathered (for example, see Grier, 1989; Tufte, 1978; and for detailed reviews, see Alesina & Roubini, 1997; Weatherford, 1988; Willett, 1988). In addition, because the theory behind these cycles relied on public irrationality, it fell out of favor with rational choice political economists.

The quest for a more individually rational theory was joined throughout the 1980s and into the 1990s. Focusing on how rational

voters could use signals of past performance to gauge future results, Fiorina (1981) developed a theory of retrospective voting. Rogoff and Sibert (1988) and Rogoff (1990) applied this retrospective nature to the study of political business cycles (see also Cukierman & Meltzer, 1986; Lohmann, 1998; Persson & Tabellini, 1990). They argue that many government activities prior to elections are meant not to deceive but to signal a level of competence. Furthermore, this signal of competence need not be solely in the realm of macroeconomic monetary policy. Rather, politicians may signal fiscal competence near an election, and the rational public would use such information about the past to help them cast their votes for the future (for example, see Keech & Pak, 1989; Suzuki, 1992).³

Members of Congress could signal such competence at the federal level by their ability to bring home pork for the district. Initial work in this area sought to identify the nature of pork barrel politics and whether it had an effect on congressional electoral fortunes. Ferejohn (1974) and Rundquist and Ferejohn (1975) develop and test a theory of distributive politics, with a focus on legislation dealing with rivers and harbors, civil works, and military expenditures. Arnold (1979) links this distributive theory with the allocation decisions often left to bureaucrats. Feldman and Jondrow (1984) find no effect of distributive spending on reelection chances. Nevertheless, they argue that incumbents continue district spending because they believe it is effective. This is especially true of vulnerable incumbents (Stein & Bickers, 1994). Recent evidence suggests that such spending has an effect earlier in the electoral cycle, deterring potential challengers (Bickers & Stein, 1996).⁴

However, localized spending need not only affect congressional and presidential success. Just as politicians in national governments might signal their abilities through monetary and fiscal policy, so too might officials in cities and states. Although they are far less able to affect the economy as a whole (Stein, 1990; but also see Brace, 1991), state and local politicians can manipulate fiscal outcomes, lowering taxes, increasing consumption spending, or accepting intergovernmental grants. The public may hold state-level officials responsible for some types of economic results and for tax levels (Kone & Winters, 1993; Niemi, Stanley, & Vogel, 1995). As such, governors carefully choose the timing and types of taxation (Berry & Berry, 1992;

Mikesell, 1978). Yet evidence of such electoral-based behavior at the local level has been limited (but see Bhattacharyya & Wassmer, 1995; Mouritzen, 1989; Strate, Wolman, & Melchior, 1993).

With respect to COPS grants, the electoral pressures appear quite clear. Mayors and council members approaching reelection may be more interested in the short-run benefits of the grant program (federal funds and more officers) than in the long-run costs (having to find local funds for the officers or cut back the police force). Whether based on fiscal illusion or as a signal of competence in securing inter-governmental grants, local elected officials are expected to be more likely to seek and receive COPS funding in the election year or leading up to the campaign in the prior year.

GOVERNMENT STRUCTURES AND INCENTIVES

Because they do not face such electoral pressures, city managers may be liberated from the shortsightedness of a grant that will soon expire. Since the wave of city reforms throughout the early 1900s, scholars have attempted to judge the effects of various city government structures on policy outcomes. This analysis established that mayors (Kuo, 1973; Salanick & Pfeffer, 1977) and city managers (Ammons & Newell, 1988; Wright, 1967) did indeed have an impact on policy outcomes (but see Morgan & Watson, 1995). Scholars made a further comparison between the policy outcomes of reformed (managed) cities and mayor-council cities. Here, the conclusions were mixed, with some evidence pointing to significant differences in policy outcomes based on city structures (Booms, 1966; Lineberry & Fowler, 1967; Lyons, 1978) and others finding no such differences (Deno & Mehay, 1987; Morgan & Pelissero, 1980). From these studies and others emerged a more complex picture (Dye & Garcia, 1978; Morgan, 1989; Svara, 1990). Not only do basic structural differences allow for policy differences, but cooperation and entrepreneurship also play a significant role (Morgan & Watson, 1992; Schneider & Teske, 1992; Teske & Schneider, 1994), as does turnover of policy makers (Wolman, Strate, & Melchior, 1996). In addition, economic conditions constrain the choices made by urban policy makers (Wong, 1988). The culmination of this work calls for a focus on the distinction between city government structures, the role of elections and politi-

cian turnover, and the economic constraints faced by policy makers. By looking at both the fiscal and political aspects of the cities regarding COPS grants, this study illustrates the complexities of city government choices over policy alternatives.

Specifically, given the ability to take a longer view of the costs and benefits of COPS grants, city managers should be less likely to apply for and accept federal funding in this area. Anecdotal evidence seems to support this claim. For example, Thomas Lewcock, city manager of Sunnyvale, California, conducted a long-term analysis of costs to the city from the COPS grant. In calculating the cost of the officers over a 10-year period, he found that the federal grant would cover only about 5% of the total cost. Noting the long-term commitment required for the grant, Lewcock commented,

Once you initiate these things it is not easy to make them go away. You end up reducing some other program that had nothing to do with this. When you look at it over time, there is not enough federal incentive to justify it. (Hedges, 1996)

Stein (1984) finds similar caution exercised by municipalities regarding other grant programs as well.

This is not to say that all elected politicians are going to be shortsighted nor that all city managers will take the longer view.⁵ Nevertheless, in the aggregate, we expect to find a greater level of COPS grant pursuit by mayor-council governments than by city managers. Moreover, it is reasonable to expect that mayors and city council members with shorter terms in office would be expected to have a shorter view of what is best for the city and would thus focus on the immediate grant benefits and discount distant grant costs.

MINORITY INFLUENCE

Members of racial and ethnic minority groups have different experiences with the police and different views about police than Whites have. Polls throughout the 1990s indicate a general perception that police in big cities are “tougher on blacks than on whites,” with more than 60% of respondents indicating that there is “very great” or “considerable” police brutality against members of minority groups

(Shaw, Shapiro, Lock, & Jacobs, 1998, p. 418). Blacks and Latinos disapprove of the job that the police are doing in far greater proportions than Whites, and non-Whites are far less likely than Whites to consider police officers to have high levels of "honesty and ethical standards" (Tuch & Weitzer, 1997). Moreover, these views are not simply socioeconomic in their origins. Weitzer and Tuch (1999) find that "middle-class Blacks are sometimes more critical of the police and justice system than are lower-class Blacks" (p. 494).

These views could lead to a suppression of grant seeking through the COPS program by communities with larger minority populations. For example, if city-level decision makers are responsive to the minority communities in their cities and if these minority communities are wary of an increased police presence, then there would be little pressure and fewer attempts to increase the police force. Alternatively, decisions about the application for COPS grants could be based on a level of racism, with less concern for the safety of minority populations causing city officials to be less prone to seek police protection for minority communities. However, other scholars may plausibly expect greater demand for increased police presence in the face of large minority populations. Regardless of the exact expectations, it seems clear from survey results that the politics surrounding policing must include an analysis of communities' racial characteristics.

COMMUNITY NEEDS

Although the above section details the role that local political and electoral considerations may play in the choices surrounding intergovernmental grants, the particular needs of the community are likely to be equally important. Indeed, the COPS program is for community-oriented policing services. Much scholarship has been dedicated to determining how well local governments meet community goals and needs. With regard to intergovernmental grants, for example, Rich (1989, 1993) finds that community characteristics help determine the allocation and use of community development block grants (see Rosenfeld, Reese, Georgeau, & Wamsley, 1995, for a summary of recent work and further analysis).

With respect to the COPS program, a variety of crime, demographic, and financial considerations are likely to affect the request, awarding, and size of the intergovernmental grants. In particular, cities with high crime and murder rates face a greater need for an expanded police force. Likewise, those cities that have other major financial commitments and are thus underspending on police may need federal funds to shore up their police forces.⁶ Similarly, cities with lower numbers of officers per capita may wish to expand their levels of police protection. In addition to crime reduction, citizens might also wish to expand police forces for non-crime-related reasons, such as emergency assistance or a general sense of security.

Demographic forces may lead to the acceptance of COPS grants. Larger cities are constantly hiring new police officers and would be in a good position to incorporate the federal grant as part of these ongoing efforts. Moreover, the larger cities may be able to exert more influence over the funding decision. Given that young people tend to commit more crimes than older people, an assessment of the percentage of the population in their teens and early twenties should help predict the need for additional grant funds. Likewise, crime tends to be associated with areas of poverty. Thus, the inclusion of measures such as median household income and unemployment levels would capture the perceived need for additional police officers.

Partly in response to the nature of the COPS program, the salary levels of police in each community may affect the city's likelihood to apply for the grant. For each officer funded, the city receives up to \$75,000 in federal funding, to cover training and salary at a declining rate over 3 years. Almost nowhere in the country is that amount sufficient to cover 75% of salary in the first year, 50% in the second year, and 25% in the third year, as was suggested by grant guidelines. Therefore the higher police salaries are in the city, the larger portion of the funding the city itself has to provide. Thus, higher salaries should be associated with less grant taking. Moreover, cities may be hesitant to apply for grants if they are not financially well positioned to fund the officers on the expiration of the COPS grant. Cities with high revenue to expenditure ratios and low per capita debt would therefore be more likely to request grants. In sum, community needs are likely to have an influence on the allocation of COPS grants in addition to any local political factors that may weigh in this decision.

NATIONAL POLITICAL CONSIDERATIONS

Although the above sections highlight how local politics and community needs may affect cities' desires for federal grant funding, another part of the COPS program involves the decisions of the COPS office in the Department of Justice regarding at what level to fund the cities requesting grants. Although few communities' requests were rejected outright, a number of cities had their proposals cut back in scale, and others were given more than they asked for. Because the federal government influenced grant receipt in the processing of requests, it may be fruitful to consider whether national political considerations played a role in the allocation of COPS grants.

Three aspects of national politics can be examined in the analysis of this program. First, members of Congress may have been able to use their influence with local politicians or with the Clinton administration to affect the decisions to apply for or to fund COPS grants. Given electoral considerations, we might expect vulnerable senators and representatives (and especially those of the president's party) to exert more influence on these decisions.⁷ Second, we may expect cities that are more supportive of the Clinton administration to be rewarded with larger COPS grants. Because the size of the grant allocation is made by an executive agency, it is possible that the decisions of the COPS office would reflect the preferences of the administration. Therefore, cities that lean more Democratic may be more likely to receive grants and may receive larger grants. Moreover, local officials may find a partnership with the federal government more attractive if they share like views with the president regarding the benefits of the COPS program. Third, particularly because Clinton wanted to proclaim the COPS program a success around the time of his reelection bid in 1996, we would expect efforts to include more cities to be increased in 1995 and 1996 prior to the election, with a decline in breadth and size of the COPS program in 1997.⁸

Table 1 summarizes the hypotheses raised in the above sections and notes potential variables used to test the hypotheses. Those variables and the form of the analyses are discussed in the next section.

TABLE 1
Main Hypotheses and Variables

<i>Hypothesis</i>	<i>Variable</i>	<i>Expected Sign</i>
Local politics		
Electoral: Mayors are more likely to apply for grants immediately prior to mayoral elections	Near elections dummy	+
Government form: Electoral-based mayor-council governments are more likely to apply for grants than city manager (reformed) cities	Mayor-council dummy	+
Term length: The longer the term of elected officials, the less likely they are to apply for COPS grants	Mayor term length	-
Minority presence: The greater the size of minority opposition to policing, the less likely the city will seek COPS grants	Percentage minority	-
Community needs		
Crime rates: The higher crime and murder rates, the more likely the city will request and receive COPS grants	Crimes per thousand residents Murders per thousand residents	+ +
Police shortage: Cities underspending on police or with low numbers of officers relative to population are more likely to seek and obtain COPS grants	Police spending percentage of budget Officers per thousand residents	- -
City size: Larger cities are more likely to request and receive COPS grants	Log(population)	+
Youth: Cities with larger percentage of residents in high-crime age groups are more likely to request COPS grants	Percentage aged 15 to 24	+
Income: Cities with lower income levels are more likely to request and receive COPS grants	Median income	-
Unemployment: Cities with higher unemployment levels are more likely to request and receive COPS grants	Unemployment rate	+
Police salaries: Cities with higher police salaries are less likely to apply for COPS grants	Average police salary	-
Financial ability: Cities better able to support officers after grant expiration are more likely to apply for COPS grants	City revenue versus city expenditures Per capita debt	+ -
National politics		
Vulnerable Democrats: Cities represented by Democratic members of Congress in at-risk seats are more likely to receive COPS grants	Vulnerable House Democrat dummy Number of vulnerable Democratic senators	+ +
Democratic bias: Cities that favor Democrats are more likely to receive COPS grants	Percentage voting Democrat in 1992	+
Electoral: Cities are more likely to receive COPS grants prior to the 1996 presidential elections	Year dummies (1995 and 1996) Year dummies (1997)	+ -

DATA ANALYSIS

When President Clinton signed the Crime Act in 1994, there were 209 U.S. cities with populations over 100,000. Although the COPS program was aimed not only at large cities, data on these cities from 1993 through 1997 serve as a sizable and suitable sample of the use of these intergovernmental grants. For most of these large cities, data were available regarding the local political setting and community needs over time.⁹ With these data, rigorous tests of the hypotheses can be conducted. We are interested in both the likelihood of a city requesting a COPS grant and the response of the federal government to these requests. Thus, we conduct our analysis in two parts. First, we use logit analyses to determine the characteristics of cities that requested the COPS grants in each year. The dependent variable therefore has a dichotomous form, taking a value of 1 in cities in years when they request the grant and 0 otherwise. As such, this part of the analysis captures the decisions by the city of whether to apply for funding through the COPS program. Second, we focus on the subset of cities that request grants to determine the federal government's response to these requests. There, we use the percentage of requested dollars that were awarded as the dependent variable. This part of the analysis captures the preferences of the COPS office, which could give cities substantially less funding or potentially more funding than they requested. Such data on requests and awards were only available from the Department of Justice for grant phases beginning in 1995 or later. Many cities requesting funding did not specify the size of grant they were seeking. To capture responses relative to requests, we limit the data set to those cities making specific funding amount requests. Responding to these requests, the COPS office awarded grant amounts between 0% (rejecting the proposal) and 276% (more than doubling the amount of the request).¹⁰ The data points consist of city years in the requests data and city requests in the responses data with yearly controls to address time trends.

INDEPENDENT VARIABLES

The variables used to test the hypotheses raised above are listed in Table 1; their sources and statistical summaries are given in the appen-

dix. A near election variable is constructed as a dummy variable, taking the value 1 if the city is holding a mayoral election in the current year or the next year.¹¹ This variable will have a positive coefficient if mayors seek electoral gains from increased grant receipt prior to elections. A mayor-council dummy variable takes a value of 1 if the city is governed by a mayor in conjunction with a city council and a value of 0 for city manager governments and the handful of commission governments. Given short-term electoral pressures associated with the mayor-council system, a positive sign is expected on the coefficient for this variable. A mayor term length variable characterizes the length of term of the mayor and is expected to be negatively associated with grant seeking. A percentage minority variable captures minority opposition to increased police presence, expected to be negatively associated with grant receipt (although a plausible theoretical case exists for a positive relationship).¹²

The independent variables associated with community needs are as follows. The crimes per population and murders per population variables are anticipated to capture the need for greater policing, with an expected positive sign on their coefficients. Percentage of city spending dedicated to police spending should take a low value for those cities that are facing a police shortage, which would make these cities more likely to seek COPS grants. A negative coefficient is expected on this variable. The police officers per population variable likewise will show police shortages, with an expected negative coefficient. $\text{Log}(\text{population})$ is the natural logarithm of the city population in thousands. This transformation reins in the effect of outliers and provides a better fit. A positive coefficient would occur if larger cities are more likely to request grants and if they receive a larger percentage of their requested amounts. Percentage aged 15 to 24 captures an age range suspected to be associated with greater potential for crime. Therefore, a positive coefficient is anticipated on this variable. Median income is expected to have a negative coefficient if wealthier communities feel less need for additional policing. Percentage unemployed may also indicate a propensity for increased crime and would therefore likely have a positive coefficient. Average police salary per officer will capture the costs to the city of providing and maintaining the officer's salary beyond the \$75,000 federal grant. Higher salaries are expected to be a disincentive for cities to hire officers through the

COPS program, so a negative coefficient is expected. City revenue versus city expenditures captures the financial well-being of the city, indicating an ability to fund the officers after grant expiration. A positive coefficient is anticipated on this variable. Similarly, city per capita debt captures the city's financial state, with an expected negative coefficient. All of these variables vary over time and across cities.¹³

With regard to national political considerations, vulnerable House Democrat dummy and number of vulnerable Democratic senators capture the electoral vulnerability of the Democratic House and Senate members representing the city. If vulnerable members (those receiving 60% or less of the vote) are likely to use their political influence to affect grant decisions, we should anticipate positive coefficients on these variables.¹⁴ Percentage voting Democrat in 1992 captures the support for Clinton in each city in the 1992 elections. Because the existing data were not aggregated by city, we rely on county-level data, which should approximate support in the major city in each county. This variable's values do not vary over time. If the COPS office is directing money toward Clinton supporters, a positive coefficient is expected on this variable. Year dummies are also included to account for time trends and to explore the possibility of timing of grant allocation around the 1996 presidential elections.¹⁵ An attempt to provide grants prior to the elections would be evident with positive coefficients on the 1995 and 1996 dummies, while a negative coefficient for 1997 would show a scaling back after the elections.

GRANT REQUESTS

The results of the logit model exploring grant requests are shown in Table 2. The first column lists the independent variables. The second and third columns show the coefficients and robust standard errors.¹⁶ The final column allows interpretation of the variables' effects by showing the percentage change in the odds of grant request given a one-unit increase in the specified independent variable.

As can be seen, support for the broad categories of local politics, community needs, and national politics are mixed, with strong support for some of the specific individual hypotheses and limited or no support for others. There is no support, for example, for the hypothesis of increased grant requests prior to mayoral elections and no support

TABLE 2
Cities Requesting COPS Grants (Logit Analysis, 1993-1997)

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Model 1</i>		<i>% Change in Odds Ratio</i>
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Robust SE</i>	
<i>Local politics</i>			
Near election	-0.130	0.186	-12.2
Mayor-council dummy	0.332**	0.195	+39.4
Mayor term length	0.011	0.101	+1.1
Percentage minority	-0.035***	0.010	-3.4
<i>Community needs</i>			
Crimes per population (1,000s)	0.007**	0.004	+0.7
Murders per population (1,000s)	3.310***	1.180	+2637.5
Percentage of city spending dedicated to police spending	-0.035***	0.014	-3.4
Police officers per population (1,000s)	-0.077	0.190	-7.4
Log (population) (1,000s)	0.726***	0.153	+106.4
Percentage aged 15 to 24	0.105**	0.048	+11.1
Median income (\$1,000s)	0.012	0.016	+1.2
Percentage unemployed	0.167***	0.045	+18.2
Average police salary per officer (\$1,000s)	0.004	0.007	+0.4
City revenue versus city expenditures	0.265*	0.177	+30.3
City per capita debt (\$1,000s)	-0.078	0.064	-7.5
<i>National politics</i>			
Vulnerable House Democrat dummy	0.035	0.164	+3.5
Number of vulnerable Democratic senators	0.053	0.124	+5.5
Percentage voting Democrat in 1992	0.005	0.010	+0.5
Year 1994	0.142	0.241	+15.3
Year 1995	1.156***	0.255	+217.6
Year 1996	0.742***	0.251	+109.9
Year 1997	-1.468***	0.299	-77.0
Constant	-7.126***	1.743	
<i>N</i>	853		
<i>LogL</i>	-478.8		
$\chi^2(22)$	161.8***		
Percentage correctly predicted	70.3		
Proportional reduction in error	39.3		

NOTE: Grant request = 1.

* $p < .10$, one-tailed. ** $p < .05$, one-tailed. *** $p < .01$, one-tailed.

for mayors with longer terms being less likely to seek grants.¹⁷ However, there is strong support for institutionalized electoral pressures in the form of mayor-council cities being more likely to request COPS

grants. Relative to those run by city managers, mayoral cities have 39% greater odds of seeking COPS grants in any given year of the program. This positive and significant coefficient captures electoral-driven governments being more likely to apply for the grants. It is likely that their short-term vision associated with electoral pressures leads to seeing the benefits of the immediate funding and discounting the long-term costs to the city of maintaining the officers.¹⁸ And yet, this electoral pressure does not manifest itself in an increase in grant seeking just prior to elections. Perhaps, the rational-expectations scholars are right in noting that the citizenry would see through such electoral-cycle behavior.

Also significant is the finding that cities with larger minority populations are less likely to seek COPS grants. A 1% increase in the minority proportion in a city is associated with a drop in the odds of COPS requests by 3.4%. One possible reason for this effect is that minority populations are more suspicious of increased police presence; they would therefore be less enthusiastic about pressuring city officials to seek COPS grants. An alternative explanation involves a level of racism, conscious or otherwise, with city officials being less concerned about providing police protection for minority populations. Either way, this finding may be surprising to those who had expected an increased police presence associated with larger minority populations.

Many of the community needs variables have a significant effect on the likelihood of cities seeking COPS grants. As expected, both the crime rate and murder rate have a positive impact on grant requests. An increase in 1 reported crime per 1,000 residents increases the odds of seeking a grant by 0.7%, and an increase in 1 murder per 1,000 residents raises the odds of seeking a COPS grant by more than twenty fold. These *actual* crime figures complement the measures that indicate *potential* for crime. The size of the youth population is positively correlated with COPS grant requests. Cities with a 1% larger 15-to-24-year-old population were 11% more likely to request grant support each year. However, there was no significant effect based on the city's median income.¹⁹ Unemployment levels did have a positive and significant correlation with grant seeking, yielding an increase of more than 18% in the odds ratio for each percentage increase in unemployment.

Perhaps, the COPS program is viewed as a short-term solution to the potentially short-term problems caused by unemployment.

Both of the variables that may capture a shortage of resources being committed to policing have the expected negative coefficients, although only the percentage of city spending dedicated to police is statistically different from zero. Each additional percentage of a city's budget dedicated to police is associated with more than a 3% decrease in the odds of seeking a COPS grant. Federal funding in this area may thus serve to smooth the transition to greater city spending on police in the future for those cities presently underspending. As expected, larger cities are far more likely to request COPS grants than smaller cities. Somewhat surprisingly, there appears to be no effect based on the level of officers' salaries. Despite that high salaries mean that the federal government provides a relatively smaller share of the costs of the added officers, these cities appear no less likely to apply for the COPS grants. The financial ability of cities to pay officer expenses after grant funds dry up seems to be an important determinant of grant seeking. Cities with strong revenue-to-expenditure ratios and low per capita debt were more likely to request COPS funding.

With regard to possible effects of national politics, only the year dummies show support for these hypotheses. Relative to the base year of 1993, there appears to be a substantial increase in COPS grants in 1995 and 1996, prior to Clinton's reelection, with a sharp decline in grant requests following that election. Clearly, many factors may have influenced these grant-seeking patterns, especially as the program was advancing in its early years, but the decline in grant requests after the 1996 elections is a curious finding. With regard to encouraging applications from strongly Democratic cities, however, the results show no support for national political pressures. In addition, the evidence of vulnerable members of Congress affecting grant applications is not statistically significant, although all of these variables have coefficients in the expected positive direction.

Taken as a whole, Model 1 does a good job of characterizing the cities requesting grants under the COPS program. It predicts 70.3% of the cases correctly, for a proportional reduction in error of 39.3%.²⁰ The findings suggest that city government type and minority presence affect the local politics surrounding COPS grant requests. Community

needs matter as well, with high-crime cities, large cities, those with large youth populations, those undersupplying police funding, those with high unemployment, and those able to support officers down the road seeking an expansion of police services through the grants. And there is some evidence of national electoral considerations, in that the COPS program expanded into large cities prior to the 1996 elections and then receded in 1997.

Another key consideration in explaining grant-seeking behavior involves cities that have been successful with grant receipt in the past being more likely to apply again in the future. In Table 3, we show two alterations to Model 1 that characterize grant requests in the first year of the program (1993) and in the subsequent years. Model 2 shows the robustness of our initial results to the case of the first year of the grant program. As before, city government type, crime considerations, undersupply of police, and population all continue to matter. In this year, however, the race variable and percentage unemployed are no longer significant. Running counter to expectations, it is found that cities with higher police salaries and lower relative city revenues were more likely to seek the grants in 1993.

Model 3 focuses on years 1994 through 1997, allowing us to include a grant in previous year variable, which is a dummy variable taking a value of 1 if the city received a COPS grant in the immediately preceding year. As expected, this variable is positive and significant. If a city received a grant in the previous year, the odds of requesting one again in the next year increase by a remarkable 75%. Although this is useful as a predictor variable, it causes some difficulty in interpreting the results regarding the other variables. For example, mayor-council cities were far more likely to seek COPS grants in 1993, and they continued to be more likely to seek the grants in 1994 through 1997. However, because the vast majority of these cities continued under the same government structure, the effect of them having received the grant in 1993 is picked up in the previous grants dummy variable, leaving the mayor-council dummy variable with an insignificant coefficient in Model 3. Therefore, we are hesitant to rely on Model 3 for any interpretations beyond noting that it continues to illustrate the patterns seen in Model 1 and that previous grant experience does appear to lead to future grant application. Some caution is warranted, however, as this previous grants variable may partly indicate merely that

TABLE 3
Cities Requesting COPS Grants Over Time (Logit Analysis)

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Model 2 (1993)</i>		<i>Model 3 (1994-1997)</i>	
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Robust SE</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Robust SE</i>
<i>Local politics</i>				
Near election	0.476	0.524	-0.228	0.206
Mayor-council dummy	1.557***	0.618	0.124	0.218
Mayor term length	0.341*	0.250	-0.059	0.117
Percentage minority	-0.005	0.023	-0.038***	0.011
<i>Community needs</i>				
Crimes per population (1,000s)	0.047***	0.017	0.000	0.005
Murders per population (1,000s)	1.375	2.864	3.034***	1.302
Percentage of city spending dedicated to police spending	-0.109**	0.048	-0.022*	0.015
Police officers per population (1,000s)	-0.470	0.506	-0.027	0.207
Log(population) (1,000s)	0.632**	0.381	0.726***	0.174
Percentage aged 15 to 24	0.003	0.112	0.110**	0.059
Median income (\$1,000s)	-0.055	0.047	0.021	0.019
Percentage unemployed	0.060	0.108	0.173***	0.055
Average police salary per officer (\$1,000s)	0.045***	0.018	-0.006	0.008
City revenue versus city expenditures	-0.875*	0.591	0.394**	0.185
City per capita debt (\$1,000s)	0.131	0.172	-0.099*	0.074
<i>National politics</i>				
Vulnerable House Democrat dummy	-0.027	0.447	0.028	0.188
Number of vulnerable Democratic senators	0.246	0.341	0.074	0.146
Percentage voting Democrat in 1992	-0.021	0.029	0.010	0.012
Year 1995	NA	NA	0.980***	0.259
Year 1996	NA	NA	0.447**	0.254
Year 1997	NA	NA	-1.764***	0.297
Grant in previous year	NA	NA	0.560***	0.190
Constant	-6.183*	4.049	-6.628***	2.038
<i>N</i>	168		685	
<i>LogL</i>	-72.4		-374.5	
χ^2	54.0***		154.7***	
Percentage correctly predicted	78.6		70.9	
Proportional reduction in error	53.8		41.3	

NOTE: Grant request = 1.

* $p < .10$, one-tailed. ** $p < .05$, one-tailed. *** $p < .01$, one-tailed.

the same types of cities seeking the grants in 1993 were likely to seek the grants in the other years as well. For example, high-crime cities in

1993 are likely to have high crime rates in 1994 and beyond and may wish to continue building up their police forces under the COPS program.

RESPONSE TO THESE REQUESTS

Although the above discussion and analysis characterizes the nature of the cities requesting the COPS grants, it does not help us understand how the federal government responded to these requests. To address this issue, we look at the subset of cities that requested grants in 1995 to 1997 and use least squares and tobit regressions to analyze the amount of the COPS request that was awarded.²¹ The dependent variable is the percentage of the requested amount that was awarded, and the independent variables remain the same as above. As before, we would expect the same signs on the variables; the same factors that lead cities to seek grants may affect the federal government's response to these requests. We might expect, however, that national political concerns will play a larger role than local politics. Results of two models are displayed in Table 4. The first is an ordinary least squares regression. Robust estimators are used to deal with heteroskedasticity, with Huber/White standard errors reported in the table. The second regression is a tobit analysis, which allows us to control for the limited nature of the dependent variable. Given a lower limit at zero (for cities whose requests were rejected entirely), the tobit analysis may better characterize the desires of the federal government.²²

Model 4 captures the federal government's response to grant requests. As expected, there is little support for local politics playing a role here. The sole significant variable in the local politics section is that of percentage minority. Above, we found that cities with larger minority communities were less likely to request COPS grants. Here, that effect seems to be taken further. Even among those cities seeking the grant, the federal government is less responsive to requests from cities with larger minority populations. Every 1% increase is associated with more than 0.5% smaller response to request.

Because of the persistence of this finding of fewer and smaller grants associated with larger minority populations, we sought to explain this result further. Relationships between minorities and police may be influenced by a variety of intervening factors, such as

TABLE 4
Percentage of Request Granted (Least Squares With Huber/White
Standard Errors and Tobit Analysis With Lower Limit at Zero)

<i>Independent Variable</i>	<i>Model 4</i>			
	<i>(Ordinary Least Squares)</i>		<i>Model 5 (Tobit)</i>	
	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>Robust SE</i>	<i>Coefficient</i>	<i>SE</i>
<i>Local politics</i>				
Near election	4.60	5.04	5.07	4.90
Mayor-council dummy	-6.46	6.10	-6.68	5.21
Mayor term length	0.94	2.52	0.81	2.84
Percentage minority	-0.58**	0.33	-0.63**	0.29
<i>Community needs</i>				
Crimes per population (1,000s)	0.17*	0.11	0.17*	0.12
Murders per population (1,000s)	8.39	30.13	10.02	29.33
Percentage of city spending dedicated to police spending	0.05	0.40	0.02	0.40
Police officers per population (1,000s)	-7.03	5.64	-6.44	5.17
Log(population) (1,000s)	9.03***	3.25	9.73***	3.27
Percentage aged 15 to 24	-2.49**	1.34	-2.50*	1.53
Median income (\$1,000s)	-0.22	0.53	-0.20	0.50
Percentage unemployed	2.96**	1.29	3.12***	1.19
Average police salary per officer (\$1,000s)	-0.23	0.18	-0.23	0.19
City revenue versus city expenditures	3.00	3.70	3.06	4.60
City per capita debt (\$1,000s)	-1.07	1.66	-1.09	1.62
<i>National politics</i>				
Vulnerable House Democrat dummy	4.01	4.49	4.18	4.71
Number of vulnerable Democratic senators	6.62**	3.93	6.73**	3.68
Percentage voting Democrat in 1992	0.31	0.25	0.32	0.31
Year 1996	26.19***	5.15	27.05***	5.12
Year 1997	19.99***	5.69	21.04***	5.48
Constant	52.89	46.07	46.41	49.82
<i>N</i>	261		261	
<i>R</i> ²	0.21		—	
χ^2	—		59.9***	

* $p < .10$, one-tailed. ** $p < .05$, one-tailed. *** $p < .01$, one-tailed.

the level of crime in minority neighborhoods, the degree to which minorities are represented in city government, and the level of residential segregation (Alozie, 1999). To explore some of these effects, we created interactive terms to determine if this finding of lower grant

support for minorities was robust across city characteristics (high-crime cities, cities with high levels of police presence, larger cities, cities with mayoral governance systems). Due to the numerous regressions that this exploration generated, only the summaries of our findings are reported here.²³ The finding of limited grants to cities with large minority populations was quite robust to all of these specifications. No significant differences were found for the minority variable when interacted with dummy variables capturing cities with high crime rates, greater police presence, larger populations, or different governing structures. Although such examinations aid in our confidence of the robustness of these findings, they do not lend themselves to a clearer understanding of the underlying causes of the effect of minority populations examined here. Clearly, future work in this area is warranted.

With regard to community needs, crime rates continue to help explain the use of COPS grants. Larger cities received a better response to their requests for officers than did smaller communities, perhaps because these major cities had more clout with the federal government. Most of the other community needs variables had the anticipated signs but were not significantly different from zero. Surprisingly, cities with larger youth populations received a cooler response to their grant requests. As with the grant requests finding above, cities with higher levels of unemployment received fuller funding from the COPS office.

With regard to national political conditions, funding is shown to expand prior to the 1996 elections, although this may simply be part of a long-term trend, with only a small reduction in funding proportions in 1997 relative to 1996.²⁴ On a more striking note, it appears that vulnerable Democrats from states and districts representing the cities in this data set seem to be able to facilitate more positive responses to cities' COPS requests.²⁵ In particular, each vulnerable Democratic senator seems to bring an additional 6.6% response to funding requests for cities in his or her home state. There also appears to be some support for Democratic-leaning cities receiving better responses to their grant requests ($p \approx .11$). For every 3% increase in Clinton's vote share in the city in 1992, the city received about 1% more favorable response to its grant request.²⁶

Model 5 shows the results from a tobit specification, accounting for the lower limit of zero on the dependent variable. The results strongly mimic those of the ordinary least squares specification. Again, there is little effect of local politics on this national government decision. With regard to community needs and characteristics, the most substantively important findings include a more positive response to large cities, to those with high crime rates, and to those with smaller minority populations. This model shows continued support for large grants prior to the 1996 elections and for a high level of responsiveness to cities represented by vulnerable Democratic senators.

CONCLUSION

This article sought to explore how both local and national political considerations affect the distribution of intergovernmental grants. Despite some unexpected results, a general pattern emerges from this data analysis. The electoral pressures found in mayoral cities seem to increase the likelihood of applying for these short-term grants. Most probably, this is because the elected politicians are more focused on the short term than are the city managers in reformed cities. Nevertheless, counter to the predictions of the political business cycle theorists, mayors appeared no more likely to apply for grants just prior to elections than just after elections. Rather, their enhanced grant seeking continued regardless of the electoral cycle. It also did not depend on the length of the mayor's term.

National political considerations also played a role, although this occurred more substantially in the federal government's response to cities' requests than in whether the requests were made or not. The likelihood of cities seeking grants and the size of those grants relative to the requests both expanded dramatically prior to the 1996 presidential elections. The awards relative to requests decreased somewhat in 1997 following the election, but the likelihood of cities requesting the COPS grants fell even more precipitously after the election year. Although these findings could be capturing other features of grant giving than national-level politics, one other finding is suggestive. In particular, vulnerable congressional Democrats appear to have used their

connections to the Clinton administration to increase the level of COPS awards relative to requests. This finding was especially strong for Democratic senators and was not evident among vulnerable Republicans.

Although there appear to have been political motivations involved in the allocation of grant funds, these grants were unquestionably used to address policy goals and community needs. High-crime cities and those currently underspending on police services were more likely to seek COPS grants, as would be expected, and the response to those grant requests also depended on the city's crime rate. In addition, cities with large youth populations and high unemployment rates appeared more likely to request grants, especially if they were in a good position to fund the larger police force on the grant's expiration. As with most grant programs, cities with a past history of success in seeking grants were found to be more likely to seek funding again in the future.

One surprising and persistent result was that cities with larger minority populations were not only less likely to request grants but also were awarded fewer officers in response to their requests. Although the sort of examination conducted here cannot determine the motivations behind this finding, further investigation is warranted in this area to help determine whether this result stems from a responsiveness to minority pressures or whether it arises from a disregard for the protection of these minority communities.

Taken as a whole, this study points to the need to explore both local and national political considerations to understand the end product of intergovernmental grant programs. As noted here, different stages of the grant application and acceptance process were subject to different political pressures. Decisions within the administration at the federal level appeared to be much more open to the pursuit of Democratic party goals and those of vulnerable Democrats in Congress than were the application decisions at the local level. In addition, local governments appeared much more attuned to meeting the community needs than were federal officials. Finally, although electoral considerations did not lead to greater grant seeking prior to mayoral elections, the necessity of elections in mayor-council cities seemed to induce the seeking of these grants that are more beneficial in the short term than in the long run.

APPENDIX
Data Descriptions and Sources

<i>Variable</i>	<i>Description</i>	<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Grant request ^a	Dummy = 1 if city requested COPS grant in given year	0.511	0.5
Percentage of requests granted ^a	Percentage of the dollar amount requested by cities that was granted by the Department of Justice	85.9	37.3
Near election ^{b,c,d}	Dummy = 1 if mayoral election occurs in given year or following year	0.644	0.479
Mayor-council dummy ^{c,d}	Dummy = 1 if city operated under a mayor-council governing system (rather than city manager)	0.407	0.491
Mayor term length ^{b,c,d}	Number of years in mayoral term	3.43	0.912
Percentage minority ^e	Percentage of city population that is non-White	29.6	16.7
Crimes per population ^{f,g}	Number of violent crimes in the city per 1,000 people	80.4	41.2
Murders per population ^{f,g}	Number of murders in the city per 1,000 people	0.141	0.135
Percentage spending on police ^{c,h}	Percentage of total city spending dedicated to police	15.8	6.74
Police per population ^{f,g}	Number of police officers per 1,000 people	2.1	0.859
Log(population) ^g	Natural log of city population in thousands	5.37	0.733
Percentage aged 15 to 24 ^e	Percentage of city population in age range between 15 and 24	15.1	1.85
Median income ^e	Median household income in thousands of dollars	29.9	8.47
Percentage unemployed ^e	Unemployment rate in city	6.3	2.69
Average police salary ^{c,f}	Average salary paid to each police officer in thousands of dollars per year	53.4	16.4
Revenue versus expenditures ^{c,g,h}	Ratio of city revenue from all sources to city expenditures	1.36	0.56
Per capita debt ^{c,e,g}	City debt in thousands of dollars divided by number of residents	1.9	1.53
Vulnerable House Democrat dummy ⁱ	Dummy = 1 if city is represented in the House of Representatives by a Democrat who received 60% or less of the vote in the previous election	0.377	0.485
Number of vulnerable Democratic senators ⁱ	Number of senators from the city's state who are Democrats receiving 60% or less of the vote in the previous election	0.942	0.853
Percentage voting Democrat in 1992 ^j	Percentage of voters supporting Clinton in 1992	44.1	9.66

a. Provided by COPS office, Department of Justice.

b. Cities of the United States, 1993-1999.

- c. Municipal Yearbook, 1993-2000.
- d. City Web pages.
- e. County and City Extra, Annual Metro, City and County Data Book, 1993-1999.
- f. Federal Bureau of Investigation, 1992-1998.
- g. <http://www.census.gov>
- h. U.S. Bureau of the Census, 1993-2000.
- i. Compiled by authors from data provided by Robert M. Stein.
- j. Scammon & McGillivray (1993), based on county-level data.

NOTES

1. A variety of federalist interests are involved in the application for and use of intergovernmental grants. See Peterson (1981, 1995).

2. For additional program details, see U.S. Department of Justice (1996).

3. With regard to budgetary choices over crime policy, Caldeira (1983) explores the electoral link at the federal government level.

4. The argument is much the same as for other types of preemptive spending, such as that explored by Goldenberg, Traugott, and Baumgartner (1986).

5. Indeed, many city managers have shorter stays in cities than do mayors and council members. Some build a career through a reputation of stepping in and quickly turning cities around.

6. Of course, lower levels of police funding might indicate less demand for policing in the city and therefore a lower likelihood of applying for COPS grants.

7. Certainly, there has been evidence of congressional influence over other distributive spending decisions (Arnold, 1979; Carsey & Rundquist, 1999; Ferejohn, 1974; Hird, 1991; Holcombe & Zardkoohi, 1981; Moore & Hibbing, 1996; Rich, 1993; Rundquist & Ferejohn, 1975).

8. Such a finding would not be unprecedented. For example, Mayer (1995) finds contract awards to be induced by presidential elections.

9. For data summaries and sources, see the appendix. About 40 cities lacked data on either city finances or crime characteristics in various years of the program. Therefore, the number of data points per year of the program was approximately 170.

10. One outlier data point was eliminated from the analysis. In 1997, Hollywood, Florida, requested \$75,000 in funding but was awarded \$675,000, which is 900% of the request amount. Inclusion of this data point makes the data analysis results reported below even stronger, but it has an undue influence on the coefficient sizes and is therefore eliminated.

11. Other specifications of nearness to elections were examined to test this hypothesis as well. None yielded a significant electoral business cycle effect. We were unable to secure information regarding whether the incumbent mayor was seeking reelection, which may have influenced the results.

12. Information on the race and ethnicity of mayors and city council members would be useful to include in this analysis. Unfortunately, such information is not consistently available, especially for the smaller cities in our sample.

13. Because many of these independent variables are themselves correlated, additional estimations were made to examine the possibility of multicollinearity. In all cases, there were no findings of substantial problems. Correlations across variables and among groups of variables

were analyzed. Highly correlated variables were examined in the models on the inclusion or exclusion of correlated variables. Although exclusion occasionally changed the levels of significance of key variables, it did not alter the fundamental findings detailed below. Such alternative specifications are not included here because of space considerations and because they are, by their nature, underspecified.

14. Other specifications were also included to account for congressional electoral considerations. We explored the average vote share of members of Congress, different thresholds of vulnerability, and Democrat versus Republican differences. The findings reported below are consistent across specifications for Democrats but are much weaker for Republicans. This is not surprising, as vulnerable Democrats were in a better position to influence decisions of the Clinton administration than were Republicans.

15. As noted by Beck, Katz, and Tucker (1998, p. 1263ff), these year dummies will not fully account for the possibility of temporal dependence, given a focus on the same cities over time. Unfortunately, their solution does not work for data sets with a very limited number of time periods. An alternative is to analyze the data on a year-by-year basis. Individual years have been analyzed by the authors, such as in Model 2. Although not every variable is found significant in every model, the general trends noted below are evident in the yearly analysis. Results of such models are available from the authors.

16. Robust standard errors are used to account for the possibility of heteroskedasticity. All regressions are carried out in Stata 6.0.

17. Term length of city council members likewise had no significant effect when included in the model. Similarly, a dummy variable capturing whether the mayor and council served terms that were staggered and overlapping was insignificant when included.

18. Although mayoral cities do tend to be larger than managed cities, it is unlikely that population size is driving this result. The models used here include a population control, and variants on this control have been examined with no significant effect on this finding.

19. Other variables along these lines were also tested with no significant effects. Such variables include per capita income, percentage of population below the poverty line, and percentage of households with a female head.

20. The modal prediction of grant seeking is true in 436 out of the 853 cases (51.1%).

21. The time period is limited by the data available from the COPS office.

22. Although the COPS office could (and did) fund grants in excess of requests, we also explored an upper limit of 100% with additional tobit analyses. Results were somewhat weakened by such a specification, as would be expected, but were consistent with those reported below.

23. Specific regression results are available from the authors.

24. These positive coefficients are relative to the percentage of each request granted in the base year, here 1995.

25. Different thresholds of vulnerability were explored with similar results. For example, changing the voting margin threshold from 60% to 55% generates greater support for the Senate finding but less for the House.

26. This finding holds also on controlling for the importance of a city to receiving the electoral votes of the state, as well as when controlling for the number of electoral votes available in the city's state. That is, cities with high levels of Democratic support received larger grants regardless of how much the city would contribute to the President's electoral count.

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